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INTRODUCTION
In 1947, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson described law
enforcement activity as "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."' The Court was weighing the constitutionality of a
warrantless search and arrest, holding that warrants should be issued
only on the judgment of a "neutral and detached" magistrate. Justice
Jackson's observation-that overzealous police officers motivated to
arrest and convict should not be trusted with the power to decide
whether a search or arrest is reasonable and based on probable
cause-rings true outside of the Fourth Amendment context as well.
* © 2011 Kavita Pillai.
I. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947).
2. Id.
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Such motivations have the potential to cloud the judgment of all
those who actively participate in law enforcement. In the realm of
forensics, where scientific objectivity and accuracy should be the top
priority3 and where jurors tend to instinctively trust forensic expert
testimony,4 allowing the practices of scientists to take on a distinct law
enforcement character risks the integrity of trials based largely or
entirely on forensic evidence.' The North Carolina State Bureau of
Investigation Crime Lab ("SBI Crime Lab") is the latest of many
such labs to fall into disrepute.6 Investigators have uncovered a
number of problems, some stemming from overzealous agent-analysts
with a crime-fighting bias.7 Without reforms in the state, forensic
3. See, e.g., 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 1.01 (4th ed. 2007) ("The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific
theory or principle depends upon three factors: (1) the validity of the underlying theory,
(2) the validity of the technique applying that theory, and (3) the proper application of the
technique on a particular occasion.").
4. See Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 255,
271 (2005) ("[T]he sloppiest work may easily satisfy a jury, who cannot be expected to
know about the difficulties of practical forensic science today."). Pennsylvania State
University Law Professor David H. Kaye, speaking in 2001 on the dangers associated with
the use of DNA in the criminal justice system, worried about the effect of poor quality
forensic science on indigent defendants, given the general trust juries have in scientific
experts:
[I]nternal pressures cause people to do certain things. The training of people in
areas in which they were testifying was almost nonexistent, and they were willing,
in a courtroom, to extend their expertise beyond its true ability. It's very effective
when someone walks into a courtroom and says, "I am a scientist."
Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and The Law: The American
Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, Panel Two: Criminal Law
and DNA Science: Balancing Societal Interests and Civil Liberties, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 401,
418 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium].
5. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the effect of
invalid forensic evidence and testimony on more than 100 cases of wrongful conviction).
6. See Agents' Secrets, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
http://www.newsobserver.com/agents (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (compiling all of the
newspaper's reporting on the SBI); infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing
other forensic lab scandals). The SBI Crime Lab was renamed the North Carolina State
Crime Laboratory by recently adopted legislation. Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, § 5,
201 1-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 40 (LexisNexis) (codified in scattered sections of N.C.
GEN. STAT.). Because this Comment discusses issues starting long before this legislation,
and because the name change is a cosmetic fix that does not alter the fact that the SBI still
runs the lab, this Comment will refer to the lab as it was formerly known.
7. See, e.g., Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Witness for the Prosecution: Lab Loyal to
LawEnforcemen4 NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 12, 2010, at IA, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/12/625107/witness-for-the-prosecution-lab.html
(revealing problems with the SBI Crime Lab, on which the NEWS & OBSERVER published
a series of investigative articles).
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science testimony that is unreliable puts the innocent at risk of
wrongful convictions! Furthermore, whether scientific evidence is
objectively reliable or not, the taint of prior improprieties could lead
to acquittals of the guilty.9
The extent of the damage from failures in the nation's forensic
science system is substantial. One study analyzed the expert
testimony given in 137 cases where DNA testing later exonerated the
convicted defendant."' The researchers in the wrongful convictions
study discovered that in sixty percent of the cases "forensic analysts
called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial-that is,
testimony with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly
unsupported by empirical data.""
Examples from other jurisdictions forecast what is in store for
North Carolina if fundamental reforms are not implemented. For a
decade in West Virginia, ending in 1989, a serologist, 2 Fred Zain,
falsified results to convict defendants who were later exonerated. 3
His misconduct resulted from a desire to see the suspects convicted
8. Cf Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 5, at 1 (showing past instances of wrongful
convictions stemming at least in part from invalid testimony or evidence).
9. Since the release of the state audit and newspaper series, defense attorneys have
raised the problems at the SBI Crime Lab at trial, and convicted inmates have sought new
trials and appeals on the basis of the lab's failings. See, e.g., Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff,
Distrust of SBI Appears in Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 24, 2010, at
LA, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/24/644545/distrust-of-sbi-appears-
in-court.html (quoting one district attorney as saying he expected to "encounter jurors
who won't believe in the SBI anymore"). Michael Peterson, the Durham, North Carolina,
novelist whose murder trial grabbed international headlines in 2003, is the most
high-profile defendant to seek a new trial based on SBI issues. See Mandy Locke, Peterson
Bases Appeal on Questions About SBI, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 16,
2011, at IA, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/02/16/992625/michael-
peterson-questions-sbi.html (explaining that the basis for his request for a new trial is that
jurors were misled into trusting analyst Duane Deaver as a "stand-up agent").
10. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id. at 2 (noting that the testimony involved seventy-two forensic analysts
employed by fifty-two labs, practices, or hospitals from twenty-five states and was not
merely the problem of a handful of analysts often called by prosecutors). In fact, the first
convicted person to ever be exonerated by DNA evidence, Gary Dotson, was the victim of
misleading testimony by a forensic scientist. Id. at 4-5. The analyst testified that both the
victim's rapist and Dotson had rare Type B blood. Id. at 4. The analyst, however, failed to
disclose that the sample could have come from the victim herself, who also had Type B
blood. Id. at 4-5.
12. Forensic serology involves the identification and study of blood and other bodily
fluids, but is distinct from DNA analysis, which attempts to connect a sample to a
particular person. Lisa A. Gefrides & Katherine E. Welch, Serology and DNA, in THE
FORENSIC LABORATORY HANDBOOK 1, 1 (Ashraf Mozayani & Carla Noziglia eds.,
2006).
13. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need
for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439,442-47 (1997).
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and a system that allowed his actions to pass undetected.14 The fallout
was significant: the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled
that all evidence and testimony from Zain was to be considered
invalid during a habeas review of a convicted defendant's case and
created a special post-conviction form for those "seeking habeas
relief on a Zain issue."' 5 West Virginia continued to deal with the
ramifications of the scandal more than a decade later. 6 Then, in a
separate scandal in the late 1990s, the FBI forensic laboratory fell
under scrutiny for problematic practices, a probe of which also
uncovered misconduct by agents favoring the prosecution. 7 These are
only two of many incidents involving faulty forensic science
testimony.18
Unfortunately, Zain is not the last serologist at the center of a
forensic science controversy. In North Carolina, former SBI agent
and serologist Duane Deaver faces allegations of misconduct that
played a role in the 1993 wrongful conviction of Greg Taylor for the
murder of a prostitute, Jacquetta Thomas. 9 In 2009, the North
14. Id. at 445-47. Zain left his job in West Virginia in 1989, but the State did not indict
him until 1994. Id. at 447,449. In the meantime, he held a forensic position in Texas. Id. at
447. Shockingly, prosecutors in West Virginia sent evidence to Zain, while he was in
Texas, after their local serologists failed to reach the conclusions the prosecutors desired.
Id.
15. In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 506-08 (W. Va. 1993). During habeas review, a defendant challenges the legality of
his arrest or imprisonment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, in
cases where scientific testimony and/or evidence played a large role in the prosecution's
case, the automatic invalidation of that evidence removes a major barrier for defendants
seeking to have their convictions overturned. See id. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals later found "no showing that any state police serologist other than Trooper Zain
engaged in any regular practice of falsifying or misrepresenting scientific results in his or
her testimony" and closed the investigation with the exception of the ongoing
accreditation process. In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div.,
445 S.E.2d 165, 167-68 (W. Va. 1994).
16. See Rachelle Bott, Zain Changed Results, Trooper Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(W. Va.), Sept. 13, 2001, at 7B, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
CG AZ 000020010914dx9d00080.
17. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA
LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES i-iii (2004)
[hereinafter DOJ REPORT]; Richard A. Serrano, Misconduct Allegations Arise in FBILab
ProbeInquiry, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at Al, available athttp://articles.latimes.com
/1997-01-30/news/mn-23649_ Icrime-lab.
18. See generally Giannelli, supra note 13 (detailing many cases of false scientific
evidence and misconduct by analysts, including incidents in Texas and Mississippi).
19. Mandy Locke, Innocence Panel Sets Greg Taylor Free, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/02/17/343552/taylor-to-
go-free.html. Deaver faced a criminal contempt charge arising out of his testimony before
the Innocence Inquiry Commission. Martha Quillin, Deaver Ordered into Talks with
Innocence Panel, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2011, at IB, available at
[Vol. 90
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Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission ("Innocence Commission"),
the first state agency of its kind,2" exonerated Taylor of the conviction
that was largely based on misrepresented forensic evidence. 21 The
exoneration prompted a wave of news stories, an investigation, and
an audit, uncovering widespread bias and abuse in the SBI Crime
Lab.22 The discoveries shook up the criminal justice world in North
Carolina and led to renewed calls for reforms.
23
The push for change in North Carolina comes on the heels of a
congressional report issued in 2009 on the state of forensic science in
the United States and identifying steps that ought to be taken to
improve the system. 24 While leaving aside reform of the law of
evidence, the report recommended an overhaul of the forensic
science system, which it found plagued by bias and unreliable
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/08/06/1394477/deaver-ordered-into-talks-with.html.
Though Deaver has been cleared of the criminal contempt charge, he remains a defendant
in a civil suit by Taylor. Joseph Neff & Mandy Locke, Ex-SBI Agent Cleared of Contempt
Charge, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 15, 2011, at IB, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/09/15/1489922/ex-sbi-agent-cleared-of-contempt.html;
Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Taylor Suit Seeks Money from SBI, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.) June 29, 2011, at 1B, available athttp://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/29
/1308453/taylor-suit-seeks-money-from-sbi.html.
20. See Patrik Jonsson, North Carolina Creates a New Route to Exoneration,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0810/pOlsOl-
usju.html; About Us, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N,
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
21. See State v. Taylor, No. 91-CRS-71728, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 17,
2010), available athttp://www.wral.com/asset/newslocal/2010/02/18/7071171/taylordecision
.pdf; Motion for Order to Show Cause at 1, State v. Deaver, 10-CRS-016362 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Oct. 7, 2010), available athttp://www.wral.com/asset/news/state/2010/10/07/8417106
/MotionExhibits andOrder.pdf (asking Deaver to show cause as to "why he should not
be held in criminal contempt for providing false and misleading testimony" before the
Innocence Commission); CHRIS SWECKER & MICHAEL WOLF, AN INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF THE SBI FORENSIC LABORATORY 5 (2010), available athttp://ncdoj.gov
/getdoc/0a92ee8 1-0667-4935-b2d3-221 d4f586c61/Independent-Review-o f-SBI-Forensic-
LAB.aspx (stating that while the Innocence Commission itself did not state a reason for its
decision to exonerate Taylor, a lot of the Innocence Commission's time was spent on the
testimony of Deaver).
22. See SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 2 (describing the Taylor case as the
impetus behind the audit).
23. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Lawyers Want a Crime Lab Independent of SBI,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08
/16/630860/lawye rs-want-crime -lab -changes.html.
24. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009)
(identifying problems in the forensic science system and making recommendations for
changes).
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science." The centerpiece of the report is a recommendation for the
creation of a national forensic science regulatory agency.26 Given the
nature of national policymaking and the gravity of the problems,
though, states may want to implement their own reforms rather than
wait for Congress to act.27 Moreover, federal reforms would only
work if states voluntarily implement them, enticed, perhaps, by access
to federal databases or funds.28
Calls for reform in North Carolina have not fallen on deaf ears.
The Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, signed into law in March 2011,
implemented a few positive changes in order to "encourage efforts to
eliminate sources of human error in forensic examinations. '29 The
Act renames the SBI Crime Lab the "North Carolina State Crime
Laboratory," de-emphasizing the law enforcement oversight but not
actually removing the lab from SBI control.3" The Act's most
significant change is the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory
Board ("Board") with forensic scientists from various disciplines as
members.31 The Board's role is to review the SBI Crime Lab's
operations and make recommendations for new programs, protocols,
and qualification standards for employees. 32 The Board is authorized,
upon request by the SBI Crime Lab's director, to review the work of
lab employees.3 The Act also creates an ombudsman to "ensure all
processes, procedures, practices, and protocols at the Laboratory are
25. See The Need to Strengthen Forensic Science in the United States: The National
Academy of Sciences' Report on a Path Forward: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 3-4 (2009) (statement of the Honorable Harry T. Edwards).
26. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 24, at 19.
27. Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill in January 2011 to create an Office of
Forensic Science within the U.S. Department of Justice, but the bill does not address
issues of independence. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 25, 2011). The bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary where it remains as of this writing. S
132: Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-132 (follow link for "View Committee
Assignments") (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
28. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS,, supra note 24, at 13
("Congress does not have free reign to amend state criminal codes, rules of evidence, and
statutes governing civil actions; nor may it easily and directly regulate local law
enforcement practices, state and local medical examiner units, or state policies covering
the accreditation of crime laboratories and the certification of forensic practitioners."); see
also DOJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that use of the FBI's DNA database is
contingent upon the lab's adherence to quality control procedures).
29. Forensic Sciences Act of 2011,2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38 (LexisNexis).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 2, at 38.




consistent with State and federal law, best forensic law practices, and
in the best interests of justice in this State."34 Furthermore, the Act
clarifies the role of SBI-employed scientists as in service to "the
public and the criminal justice system."35 These changes are a start,
although only time will tell how effective the advisory board will be.36
The suggestions in this Comment go beyond this legislation to address
the root causes of the problems that led to a breakdown in the system.
The creation of the Forensic Science Advisory Board, however, is still
instrumental to the success of any future reforms.
To properly address this situation in North Carolina, forensic
crime laboratories should be removed from direct state control. Local
or state law enforcement agencies or the State generally should no
longer operate forensic crime labs, though any labs working on North
Carolina cases should still answer to the State under its regulatory
authority. Labs in the private sector should contract with the state to
provide services to law enforcement, state public defenders, and state
district attorneys' offices, while also remaining open to private
defense counsel. Independent labs would be an important tool in
eliminating the bias discovered during the recent probe of the SBI
Crime Lab, but they would also serve two other important purposes:
prosecuting indigent defendants with objective forensic science that is
not directly linked to law enforcement and providing defendants with
access to the scientific reports with which the prosecution will
confront them at trial.
Finally, all forensic laboratories working on North Carolina cases
should be accredited by a state-approved accrediting agency. The
State should adopt uniform requirements and guidelines across every
field of the forensic sciences regarding the reliability of certain
34. § 6(a), at 40. The obmbudsman's office recently issued its first report with several
recommendations that will be mentioned throughout this Comment. See OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, N.C. ATTORNEY GEN., OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT 7 (2011) [hereinafter
OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT], available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/da328def-dab5-4297-
b85e-77bb490ca2cb/Report-of-the-Ombudsman.aspx (scroll to the twelfth page of the
document for the beginning of the Ombudsman's Report); infra notes 78, 131, and 220;
infra note 92 and accompanying text.
35. 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 38.
36. Hopefully, North Carolina will do better than Maryland's first attempt to create
such a board. Maryland created a similar advisory board, the Maryland State Forensic
Sciences Advisory Board, by executive order in 2006. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2006.11, MD.
CODE REGS. 01.01.2006.11 (2006).That board never held a meeting, as its members were
never appointed. Forensic Sciences Advisory Board, MD. STATE ARCHIVES (Oct. 14,
2008), http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/defunct/html/15forensic.html.
However, Maryland currently has a Forensic Laboratory Advisory Committee. MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-2A-12 (LexisNexis 2009).
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techniques, reporting of test results, and other best practices. Such
uniform standards could be a resource for judges in determining the
admissibility of forensic evidence at trial or act as a stop-gap where
judges are not performing this role. Moreover, a successful makeover
of North Carolina's system could serve as a model for other states in
the absence of federal action, as well as prompt the federal
government to initiate nationwide reform.37
Part I of this Comment details the state of the forensic science
system in North Carolina, as well as the potential ramifications of past
errors that have yet to be fully realized in the aftermath of the SBI
Crime Lab scandal. Part II describes the primary solution-
independence of forensic laboratories-and argues why incorporating
a burgeoning private forensic science industry will be key in
eliminating bias. Part III discusses the need for government-required
accreditation and uniform best practices. This Part also examines how
these suggested reforms will help in the absence of strong legal
standards of admissibility, as well as why these proposals will do more
to fix the system than tightening legal evidentiary rules. Finally, Part
IV addresses some concerns regarding an approach that utilizes
private sector labs to perform work for the government in criminal
cases.
I. A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE REVEALS DEEP-SEATED PROBLEMS
IN THE SBI CRIME LAB
North Carolina's forensic science system came under fire after an
innocent man's conviction was overturned. The problems revealed,
however, were not new, and the public attention paid to the SBI
Crime Lab only intensified after the dramatic exoneration, leading to
further discoveries of improper practices and tainted cases and
ultimately drawing the attention of state legislators. This Part traces
the history of the SBI Crime Lab and details the scandal that has
unfolded.
The State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI") is a statewide law
enforcement agency charged with helping local law enforcement
agencies, at their request, with serious criminal investigations.38 The
37. Other jurisdictions are already thinking creatively to shore up the integrity of their
forensic science systems. One proposal in Washington, D.C., for example, would remove
the District's crime lab from police control and place it under the mayor's control.
Freeman Klopott, Gray Backs Independent Crime Lab, WASH. EXAMINER, Feb. 7, 2011,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/dc/2011/02/gray-backs-independent-crime-lab.
38. State Bureau ofInvestigation, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ncdoj.gov
/About-DOJ/State-Bureau-of-Investigation.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
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agency also has original jurisdiction over several specific criminal
areas, including drug and arson investigations. 9 The SBI Crime Lab
assists in these state and local investigations by examining evidence
for free for any public law enforcement agency in North Carolina,
utilizing three facilities located across the state. 4° As a unit of the SBI
since its inception in 1937, the SBI Crime Lab falls under the broader
umbrella of the North Carolina Department of Justice, ultimately
answering, therefore, to the state attorney general.4' An assistant
director oversees the SBI Crime Lab itself and reports to the director
of the SBI, both of whom are appointed by the attorney general, and
special agents-in-charge head each laboratory facility.
42
This law enforcement structure contributed to the problems that
led to Greg Taylor's wrongful conviction. Taylor was accused of the
September 1991 murder of Jacquetta Thomas, who was found
stabbed and beaten in downtown Raleigh, North Carolina.43 Police
quickly focused their investigation on Taylor, who had been doing
drugs with a friend in the area and whose SUV was found abandoned
near the crime scene. 4 In 1993, a police officer involved in the
investigation testified against Taylor, basing his testimony on a lab
39. Id.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-16 (2009) (establishing the crime lab and its purpose as a
resource to local law enforcement for major crimes), amended byForensic Sciences Act of
2011, § 10; Crime Lab, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://ncdoj.gov/About-DOJ/State-
Bureau-of-lnvestigation/Crime-Lab.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 114-16.
42. Id.; SBI Director & Leadership, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://ncdoj.gov/About-
DOJ/State-Bureau-of-Investigation/SBI-Director-and-Leadership.aspx (last visited Nov.
12, 2011). After the scandal broke, then-SBI Director Robin Pendergraft left for a
different position within the state's Department of Justice and was replaced by Greg
McLeod. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Cooper Replaces SBI Director, Suspends
Bloodstain Analysis, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 30, 2010, at 1A, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/07/30/603969/cooper-replaces-sbi-director-suspends
.html. The SBI Crime Lab itself is currently led by Assistant Director Judge Joe John Sr.
Crime Lab, supra note 40. Judge John took over in October of 2010 as the acting assistant
director and was charged with overseeing audits of the other sections of the crime lab that
were not covered in the initial audit. Cooper Names Another Interim Chief of SBI Crime
Lab, WRAL.COM (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/8445418/. Judge
John's position became permanent in October of 2011 after an advisory panel conducted a
nationwide search and unanimously recommended Judge John's permanent appointment
to Attorney General Roy Cooper. Acting SBI Crime Lab Director Permanently Gets the
Job, NBC17.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www2.nbcl7.com/news/2011/oct/07/acting-sbi-
crime-lab-director-permanently-gets-job-ar- 1475464/.
43. Mike Klinkosum, State v. Taylor and The North Carolina State Bureau of
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report prepared by SBI agent-analyst Duane Deaver.45 The officer
testified that, according to the report, tests on the fender liner of
Taylor's vehicle showed the presence of blood.46 The jury convicted
Taylor of first-degree murder, sentencing him to life in prison.47
Fourteen years later, Deaver disclosed that the presence of blood
indication was based on preliminary presumptive tests. 48 Such tests
are accepted at face value if they yield a negative result but must
prompt further testing upon a positive result due to the test's
tendency to yield false positives. 49 He also disclosed that additional,
more sensitive tests were done and that these tests were negative for
the presence of blood-a fact left out of Deaver's report and never
disclosed during Taylor's trial." Deaver ultimately told the Innocence
Commission that he was following SBI standard procedure by not
reporting the negative test result following a positive presumptive test
result." The state attorney general fired Deaver in January 2010,
citing contempt of court charges filed by the Innocence Commission
and an inappropriate statement at the end of a videotaped bloodstain
pattern experiment in another murder investigation." Although the
bloodstain experiment itself was discredited by other scientists as
45. Transcript of Evidence at 140-45, State v. Taylor, 91-CRS-71728, 92-CRS-307
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 20, 2003), available athttp://www.wral.com/asset/news/loca/2009/09
/16/6014105/79539-TRANSCRP.pdf. The assistant district attorney prosecuting the case
misspoke, erroneously stating that Deaver's first name was "Wayne." Id. at 140. The
witness, Agent Donald Pagani, however, correctly identified Deaver, calling him "P.D.
Deaver," an abbreviation for Paul Duane Deaver. Id.; see Motion for Order to Show
Cause, supra note 21, at 1 (showing Deaver's full name to be "Paul Duane Deaver").
46. Transcript of Evidence, supra note 45, at 140. The testimony of the presence of
blood was based on a field test using a chemical known as phenolphthalein and the SBI
report stating that a test at the lab revealed "chemical indications for the presence of
blood." Id. at 141, 145.
47. See SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 5.
48. Id. at 6. A familiar example of a "presumptive test" is the use of luminol at crime
scenes to detect blood. Id. at 16. For more on presumptive tests, see infra notes 168-71 and
accompanying text.
49. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 17.04 (describing sensitive tests
such as phenolphthalein and luminol which are conclusive when yielding negative results
but are disputed with regard to positive results). Laboratories typically run preliminary
tests, followed by presumptive tests, and then confirmatory tests. Id.
50. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 6.
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. Joseph Neff & Mandy Locke, SBI Fires Much-Criticized Agent NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 11, 2011, at IB, available athttp://www.newsobserver.com
/2011/01/11/912357/sbi-fires-much-criticized-agent.html; see also Motion for Order to Show
Cause, supra note 21, at 1 (requesting that Deaver show cause as to why he should not be
held in criminal contempt for his false testimony in the Taylor case). Instead of facing a




tailor-made for the prosecution, Deaver's statement was cited as the
reason for his firing.53 He reportedly stated "Oh, even better, holy
cow, that was a good one. Beautiful. That's a wrap, baby." 4 Though a
judge dismissed the criminal contempt charge, 5 Deaver and four
other former agents still face a civil lawsuit by Taylor.56
Deaver's report may not have been the decisive factor in sending
Taylor to prison for seventeen years. Moreover, the disclosure of the
report's failings may not have been the key that let him out. 7
Nevertheless, the consequences have been enormous. An
investigation by Raleigh's News & Observer found fraud in the lab's
bloodstain analysis unit, policies that openly favored the prosecution
and encouraged bias, and instances of testimony reporting ballistic
tests as conclusive when such tests are widely recognized to be
subjective. The ensuing controversy also prompted the attorney
general to order an audit of the lab's serology unit that identified
troubling practices at the SBI Crime Lab extending over a sixteen-
year period.59 The audit noted "the potential that information that
was material and even favorable to the defense of criminal charges
filed was withheld or misrepresented" and blamed the issues on,
among other things, lab policies, bias, a lack of standards, and an
excess of discretionary authority on the part of the analysts.6"
The audit focused on cases similar to Taylor's and found that lab
files, other than final reports, were routinely withheld from the
accused for review and were not requested by prosecutors or defense
attorneys.61 In addition, 230 files, including seven death penalty cases,
were plagued by problems like those in Taylor's case.62 In each case,
lab notes showed that a positive presumptive test had been followed
up by a negative, inconclusive, or no-result confirmatory test; yet, the
final reports did not include these follow-up tests.63 The audit stated
that in five of the cases, all handled by Deaver, the results were
blatantly misrepresented; the report indicated the presence of blood
53. Neff& Locke, supra note 52.
54. Id. (describing the comment as one that was "more film director than scientist").
55. Neff& Locke, supra note 19.
56. Locke & Neff, supra note 19.
57. Cf SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that the three-judge panel that
freed Taylor never announced its reasoning).
58. See generally Agents' Secrets, supra note 6 (compiling all of the newspaper's
reports on the SBI).
59. SeeSWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 2,4, 30-31.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.at4,25-26.
62. See id. at 9.
63. Id.
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or inconclusive results when the confirmatory test was, in fact,
negative.64
The audit also found that analysts left out the inconclusive
follow-up tests as part of "sanctioned practice" prior to 1997 and as
part of official SBI policy after 1997.65 As late as 1996, SBI guidelines
told analysts not to provide files and notes to the defense without a
court order, but the lab made the files available to the prosecutor
upon request.66 Finally, the audit noted that the section chief at the
time viewed law enforcement as the SBI Crime Lab's customer, for
whom results should be tailored.67
The report, drafted following the conclusion of the audit,
recommended that the SBI review the identified problematic cases;
provide training in "constitutional and statutory discovery
requirements, legal aspects of forensic science and the role of forensic
laboratories as an objective reporter"; and create procedures for
routinely providing allrelevant lab files to the defense.68
Though the full extent of the fallout from the audit and news
reports has yet to be realized, the judicial system has begun to take
notice. In December 2010, a judge, citing shoddy work by the SBI
Crime Lab, threw out charges against Derrick Allen, a man jailed for
twelve years for the murder and sexual assault of a two-year-old girl.
69
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id. at 12. An FBI memo states that the SBI's reporting practices were not in line
with common practices at other labs. Joseph Neff & Mandy Locke, SBI in Minority on
TestResults, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 26,2010, at 1B, available athttp://
www.newsobserver.com/2010/12/26/881887/sbi-in-minority-on-test-results.html.
66. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 13. Furthermore, the audit states that this
dual standard, where prosecutors receive reports upon request but defense attorneys must
seek a court order, reflects an "obvious conflict." Id. Any practice of withholding results is
constitutionally suspect. Legally, it is the prosecutor's duty to provide exculpatory
evidence to the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). It is important to
note, however, that "information in the files or possession of an investigative agency is
deemed to be in the possession of the Prosecutor." SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 8.
Thus, regardless of whether prosecutors were aware of the reports, the State may be held
responsible for withheld files.
67. SWECKER &WOLF, supra note 21, at 28. The audit did state that the chief and
analysts at the lab considered the "criminal justice system as a whole" to be their client. Id.
at 20.
68. See id. at 29. Because lab files in the possession of state lab employees are deemed
under the law to be in the possession of the prosecutor, the prosecutor is responsible for
making sure the defense receives exculpatory materials. Id. at 8. However, practically
speaking, if prosecutors are also not receiving this information from the lab, fulfilling this
constitutional requirement may be extremely difficult.
69. J. Andrew Curliss & Joseph Neff, Allen's Charges All Thrown Out, NEWS &




Confirmatory tests on the victim's underwear were negative for
blood, contradicting the final report issued by the lab and used by
prosecutors in their case against Allen.7"
Given the seriousness of the problems identified by the audit and
the consequences that have resulted, the recommendations do not go
far enough. The audit explicitly states that many of the tests and
policies outlined in the report are no longer in use,7 but the
atmosphere and lack of accountability that allowed those policies and
tests to go unchallenged for as long as they did will continue to exist
until they are directly addressed.72 Similarly, the recently passed
Forensic Sciences Act takes aim at the problems73 but is not
aggressive enough in its attempt at reform. What happened in West
Virginia demonstrates the need for more than a quick fix. Years after
Zain's actions and after attempts to address the problem, officials
discovered more instances of misconduct by a different lab analyst.74
If North Carolina does not take substantive steps to overhaul its
forensic science system, the same mistakes will likely be repeated.
II. SEPARATING SCIENCE AND CRIME-FIGHTING TO FURTHER
JUSTICE
The proposals that follow involve eliminating the SBI Crime Lab
altogether and bringing in the private sector as part of the solution to
the forensic science issues in North Carolina. However, as detailed in
Part III, oversight will be key to using the private sector effectively.
While several sources cited herein utilize the term "privatization,"
this Comment argues for a private-public partnership that combines
private sector advantages with strict government regulation. This
structure is not usually what comes to mind with the politically-
charged term of"privatization," though that is often what is meant:
70. Id.
71. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 31.
72. CUJ. Andrew Curliss & Joseph Neff, Lab Analyst Shrugs OffAudit That Rocked
SB!, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 10, 2010, at IA, available athttp://www
.newsobserver.com/2010/12/10/854147/lab-analyst-shrugs-off-audit-that.html (revealing
that at least one analyst rejected the report's findings as opinion); Joseph Neff, J. Andrew
Curliss & Mandy Locke, SB! Culture Resists Change, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Dec. 12, 2010, at IA, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/12/12/857966/sbi-
culture-resists-change.html#storylink=misearch.
73. See generally Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38
(LexisNexis) (providing a variety of conservative reforms, including changing the lab's
name and creating an advisory board).
74. See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 173-74 (2007) (finding that in the years
following the Zain affair employees ignored important procedures).
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The alternative to state ownership is rarely purely private,
unregulated firms. State ownership is only one form of the
continuum of governance structures that reflect the level of
state regulation of public and privately owned firms. Many of
the theoretical arguments for privatization are based on the
premise that the harmful effects of state intervention have a
greater impact under state ownership than under state
regulation, not that the harmful effects can be eliminated
through privatization."
A. Addressing Bias
With the state's crime lab under the umbrella of statewide law
enforcement, analysts may begin to see themselves as investigators
and, in some cases, feel the pressures to convict far more than the
restrictions of scientific objectivity would otherwise allow. This bias
can infect the results of scientific inquiry that are then presented to
juries as impartial science. The problem requires an aggressive
solution-removing crime labs from law enforcement oversight and
from the government's direct control.
Positioning crime labs outside the province of law enforcement
will limit the tendency for analysts to see themselves as crime-fighting
agents with the objective of catching and convicting criminals,
allowing them to occupy the role they were intended to have-
scientists with no personal or professional stake in the outcome of any
particular test.76 While simply employing analysts in the private sector
may not eliminate personal biases on the part of the employees, this
action will remove incentives to favor the State's case inherent in a
system where the scientists are themselves not only state employees
but are also often employed as law enforcement personnel.77 In North
Carolina, about half of the analysts in the SBI Crime Lab during the
audited period were sworn SBI agents.7" Experts in cognitive bias
75. William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 331 (2001) (internal citations
omitted).
76. JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING THE PRACTICE AND USE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE:
A POLICY REVIEW 6 (2008), available athttp://truthinjustice.org/forensics-fin.pdf.
77. Id.
78. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 16. There may be reluctance to employ non-
agents in some fields where law enforcement perceives a need for extra secrecy. The audit
of the SBI Crime Lab noted that positions in the latent fingerprint section were not filled
with qualified non-SBI agents because of its use in the investigation of "clandestine drug
laboratories." Id. Further, biases may be more pronounced in more subjective disciplines
such as fingerprint analysis. See JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 76, at 6; see also GIANNELLI
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, §§ 16.01-16.12 (noting the importance of fingerprint
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argue that it is this "institutional regime of police forensics" that
creates improper motivations.7 9 Because of the close working
relationship fostered in this system, lab employees subconsciously
adopt the role of prosecutor, allowing the State's agenda to color
their work as scientists. 80 Experts concerned about cognitive bias
worry less about gross misconduct, which may result from deeper,
more personal biases, and more about the effect on otherwise good
scientists: "If permitted to run uncontrolled through forensic practice,
observer effects can lead competent and honest forensic scientists,
using well-validated techniques, to offer sincere conclusions that are,
nevertheless distorted and inaccurate.' Moreover, when these
cognitive effects become pervasive enough, the entire system may fall
prey to a pro-prosecution point of view. This appears to be the case
with the SBI Crime Lab, as evidenced by its overtly pro-prosecution
policies regarding the sharing of reports. 82 The problem is worse when
the legislative mandate authorizing the lab's existence affirms the
improper role. Until recently, North Carolina law stated that SBI
Crime Lab employees must "render a reasonable service to the
prosecuting officers of the State in the discharge of their duties.
83
When even subtle suggestion can infiltrate a lab's collective psyche,
overt statements of purpose like this may create even bigger
evidence, the limitations of the science of fingerprint analysis, and the numerous instances
of mistaken identifications). The first report of the ombudsman to the SBI Crime Lab
recommended eliminating the preference for sworn law enforcement officers in postings
for open lab positions and reviewing the requirement that "analysts reporting to
Clandestine Laboratories be sworn law enforcement officers." OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT,
supra note 34, at 7. Any effort to remove the crime laboratory from the purview of law
enforcement will have to address the issue of the use of forensics in sensitive police
operations. However, the author does not see this as a barrier to independence as other
sections of the laboratory utilize non-sworn employees and surely, at least on occasion,
examine evidence in sensitive cases.
79. Koppl, supra note 4, at 262-64 ("Only a structural change in the organization of
forensic work is likely to greatly reduce cognitive bias in forensic work.").
80. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 76, at 6; see D. Michael Risinger et al., The
D aubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2002) (discussing a study of role
and its cognitive effects that found forensic scientists "inevitably become part of the effort
to bring an offender to justice" when they act as an "arm of the prosecution" and as a
result take on a "viewpoint colored brightly with prosecutorial bias" (quoting James E.
Starrs, The Ethical Obligations of the Forensic Scientist in the Criminal Justice System, 54 J.
ASs'N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL CHEMISTS 906, 910 (1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
81. Risinger et al., supra note 80, at 11.
82. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 13.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-16 (2009), amended byForensic Sciences Act of 2011, sec.
10, § 114-16, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 42 (LexisNexis).
2011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
problems: "If even the mildest of expectations can affect perception,
then it is not surprising to find that where an observer has strong
motivation to see something, perhaps a motivation springing from
hope or anger, reinforced by role-defined desires, that something has
an increased likelihood of being 'seen.' '"84 Eliminating the
"institutional regime" will go a long way toward reducing subtle pro-
prosecution bias and overtly pro-prosecution practices and policies.
This change could also add an additional degree of separation
between the police investigators and the analysts who, under the
current system, work too closely to direct the investigation toward a
desired conclusion." When law enforcement and lab personnel are no
longer colleagues pursuing a common goal, the two sides may be less
inclined to engage in improper collaboration. As one study found:
[E]vidence "often is presented to the forensic scientist in a
needlessly suggestive manner." The samples are labeled as
coming from the defendant or from the victim. The samples are
"frequently accompanied by a synopsis of the investigation
indicating the reasons that the investigators believe the suspect
is guilty." This creates a bias by suggesting to the forensic
worker what result is expected or correct. 6
Though removing the lab from state control may lessen bias
toward the State, preventative measures must be taken to prevent a
different improper motive, maximizing profits, from tainting results.
The desire to profit could lead labs to tailor results toward pleasing a
major client, a status for which the State would certainly qualify.87
Potential side effects aside, creating truly independent labs will solve
the bias problem the state is facing now. This reform will prevent
84. Risinger et al., supra note 80, at 24.
85. Cf Koppl, supra note 4, at 262 (discussing how law enforcement officers may
present evidence to analysts along with a summary of their theory of the case). Koppl also
notes a move to the private sector would reduce state influence because, unlike public
labs, private labs may have more than one client. Id. at 273. "In the current system, the
police in a given jurisdiction have monopsony power in the forensics market. Such power
may give them the ability to exercise inappropriate influence on the lab or labs in their
jurisdiction." Id. In contrast, private labs, Koppl argues, could service several police
jurisdictions. Id.
86. Id. at 262 (quoting Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for
Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 160 (1991)) (internal citations omitted). See
generallyRisinger et al., supra note 80 (discussing observer effects on the scientific method
and specifically how bias leads well-meaning forensic scientists to put forth inaccurate
conclusions).
87. See infra Part IV.B (addressing the incentive to maximize profits).
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superiors from creating an atmosphere where scientists will seek to
garner convictions that are not their responsibility to secure.88
Taking advantage of private sector resources would not be
wholly unprecedented, as several state and local governments already
utilize private labs.89 The SBI Crime Lab, in fact, farmed out its
bloodstain analysis work to LabCorp, a for-profit corporation
providing laboratory analysis services,9° in the wake of the audit and
Taylor case.91 Moreover, the first report of the new ombudsman to
the SBI Crime Lab recommends that the lab consider contracting out
its toxicology testing in impaired driving cases in order to reduce a
case backlog.9" A private market already exists nationwide for
forensic laboratories, with one study estimating the market will reach
$20 billion in the coming years.93 Moreover, at least one state crime
lab uses private laboratories to do work it either lacks the expertise or
time to do itself94 In 2004, about half of all publicly funded crime
laboratories used private labs to supplement their own services.95
Despite the cost of outsourcing cases piecemeal to private
laboratories, law enforcement agencies often find the benefits worth
88. See Risinger et al., supra note 80, at 21 (discussing how a forensic scientist's
superiors can affect the objectivity of the forensic scientist's work).
89. See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2005, at 1
(2008) (noting that a large portion of publicly funded labs turn to private labs for help with
their workload); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA TASK
FORCE ON FORENSIC SERVICES REPORT 37 (2003) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT],
available athttp://ag.ca.gov/publications/#forensic (click on link for "California Task Force
on Forensic Services Report") (discussing California's use of private labs); David M.
Trontz, Broward Law Enforcement Hiring Private Labs to TestDNA, MIAMI CRIM. DEF.
LAW. BLOG (Aug. 2,2010, 1:02 PM), http://www.miamicriminaldefenselawyerblog.com
/2010/08/broward-law-enforcement-hiring.html (reporting that the Fort Lauderdale Police
sought federal grants to subsidize the cost of using private labs for DNA analysis).
90. About LabCorp, LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/wps/portal/aboutus (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011).
91. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, SBI Looking to Private Crime Lab, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 1, 2010, at 3B, availableathttp://www.newsobserver.com
/2010/10/01/712960/sbi-looking-to-private-crime-lab.html.
92. OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 7.
93. Forensic Market to Reach $20.52 Billion by2015, FORENSIC MAG. (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.forensicmag.com/news/forensic-market-reach-2052-billion-2015.
94. California public labs, for example, sometimes used private labs for services they
did not perform. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 89, at 37. California, like many states,
deals with slow turnaround times and large backlogs. Id. at 44-46. Law enforcement
agencies in the state spent about $6.6 million sending more than 60,000 cases to private
laboratories. Id. at 50.
95. DUROSE, supra note 89, at 1.
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the cost.96 Private labs can get the results to investigators faster and
more efficiently because of their ability to hire employees quickly as
demand for services rises.97 They also often have access to more up-
to-date technology. 98
Other nations have also experimented with new structures for
their forensic science systems. 99 In 1991, calls for forensic science
reform in the United Kingdom led to the nation's forensic science
laboratory, the Forensic Science Service ("FSS"), becoming an
executive agency that could accept any client. i 0 Police departments
paid for forensic analysis on a case-by-case basis. 1 The results may
indicate, however, that the change did not go far enough--defense
attorneys still did not trust analysts from the FSS to perform unbiased
work. 2 In 2010, with the general costs of England's criminal justice
system ballooning, the government announced it would close the FSS
and move to a wholly private system.
10 3
The use of private labs both on a small scale in the United States
and on a larger scale in other countries demonstrates that such a
change in North Carolina may constitute "out-of-the-box" thinking
but certainly is not an unprecedented idea.
B. Maintaining an Adversarial System and Defendants'Access to
Information
That the United States criminal justice system should be
adversarial and protective of defendants' rights is clear from Supreme
Court decisions requiring appointed counsel in serious criminal cases
96. Jeannine Heinecke, Making the Case for "Genetic Justice," LAW ENFORCEMENT
TECH., Mar. 2007, at 82, 86, available at http://www.officer.com/print/Law-Enforcement-
Technology/Making-the-Case-for-G enetic-Justice/ 1 $35700 (noting that agencies can
obtain results from private laboratories sooner than they could from state laboratories).
For a discussion of why contracting with private labs for all tests, rather than occasionally
farming out work, might be cost-effective, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
97. Heinecke, supra note 96, at 87 (noting that private labs can hire analysts in
response to market conditions and that such privately hired analysts can become
productive members of the team much sooner than analysts in the public system). For
discussion of the efficiencies of private labs, see infra Part IV.A.
98. Heinecke, supra note 96, at 87-88.
99. See generally David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996) (describing various admissibility standards
and forensic science structures in foreign countries).
100. Id. at 171.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 171-72. Despite the change in status of the FSS, observers found that
defendant access to forensic experts remained poor. Id. at 172.




and defendant-protective rules of evidence. °4 The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, and the presumption of innocence, for example, are
safeguards that "insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty."' 5 In an ideal adversary system, then, where scientific
evidence and expert testimony come into play, the defendant could
and would hire her own experts and order her own tests. 6 In reality,
this rarely happens.'017 In the previously discussed national wrongful
convictions study, researchers found that defense experts testified in
only 19 out of the 137 cases studied." 8 Defense attorneys are often
inexperienced regarding the use of scientific evidence and do not
adequately challenge the State's experts.'0 9 Furthermore, funding for
defense experts and testing is spotty, with many judges denying funds
to hire such experts."0 In North Carolina, a statute requires that
104. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing, in a
landmark opinion penned by Justice Black, that state courts, like federal courts, must
provide counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases and noting that every defendant
should "stand[] equal before the law").
105. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
106. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 4.01 (discussing how even the
presence of counsel can fail to provide a defendant with an adequate defense where
funding is necessary). Justice Cardozo has said, too, that experts often are required for an
adequate defense and the inability to utilize them will put defendants at an "unfair
disadvantage." Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929).
107. See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 5, at 89.
108. Id.; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing results of
wrongful convictions study).
109. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 5, at 89.
110. Id. at 89; Symposium, supra note 4, at 408 ("Some courts are more stubborn than
others about providing funds for experts retained by the defense."). The Symposium
transcript cites cases on both sides of the funding issue. Id. at 408 n.8. The transcript cites
Dubose v State, 662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995), which held that the failure to provide funds
for independent experts to an indigent defendant violated due process, as well as Harrison
v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995), superseded by rule, IND. CRIM. R. 12, on other
grounds as stated in Allen v. State, 737 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. 2000), writ of habeas corpus, new
trial granted on other grounds sub nom., Harrison v. Anderson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.
Ind. 2004), affd sub nom., Harrison v. McBride, 428 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2005), superseded
by statute as stated in Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946 (Ind. 2009), which held that a similar
failure was nota violation of due process. Judges often deny funding despite the fact that
many state statutes purport to provide such funds and Supreme Court precedent holds
that due process may require it. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, §§ 4.02,
4.04. For example, the Federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006), provides
poor defendants with expert assistance, but some courts require the defendant to show
that the testimony would be " 'pivotal' or 'critical' to the defense." GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 4.03, at 220. The Supreme Court has extended the due
process requirement that the defense be allowed access to experts beyond its facts to non-
capital cases. Id. § 4.05(a) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)). Lower courts,
however, are split on specific requirements, such as the burden the defendant must meet
to show the need for expert assistance. Id. § 4.05(e). Furthermore, Ake dealt with
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"[flees for the services of an expert witness ... for an indigent person
and other necessary expenses of counsel shall be paid by the State in
accordance with rules adopted by the Office of Indigent Services. ' n '
Those rules cover the provision of funds in capital cases." 2 In non-
capital cases, the office will not provide funds absent a court order, in
accordance with procedures in place prior to the office's creation."3
North Carolina courts have found that such assistance requires a
defense showing of "particularized need.""' 4 The defendant must
establish either that without the assistance he would not receive a fair
trial or that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the expert will
materially assist him in the preparation of his case." ' 5 Furthermore,
"[m]ere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence is available is not
enough to require that such help be provided" to an indigent
defendant." 6 The determination is made on a case-by-case basis at the
discretion of the trial judge." 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina frequently affirms trial
judges' determinations that expert assistance to the defendant is not
required, usually when the defendant requests a psychiatric expert."'
psychiatric expert assistance in an insanity case, not forensic evidence, though the Court
later indicated that the assistance of other scientific experts is not outside the scope of
Ake. Id. § 4.05(c). Some worry that despite the mandate, the resources actually provided
are inadequate. Id. § 4.02.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (2009), amended byAct to Make Technical, Clarifying,
and Other Modifications to the Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act, § 31.23C.(b), § 7A-454, 2011-5 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 485, 517
(LexisNexis).
112. See generally Memorandum from the Office of Indigent Def. Servs. to Indigent
Def. Experts (Sept. 1,2011), available athttp://www.ncids.org/Rules% 20&% 20Procedures
/Fee% 20and% 20Expense% 20Policies/Expert% 20fees% 20memo.pdf (specifying expert
witness fee rates and reimbursable expenses for Indigent Defense Services ("IDS")
funding).
113. See generally OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERvS., NON-CAPITAL EXPERT
REQUESTS & PAYMENTS 1 (2007), available athttp://www.ncids.org/Rules%20&
% 20Procedures/Fee% 20and% 20Expense% 20PoliciesiNon-capital% 20experts.pdf
(requiring attorneys in non-capital cases to receive judicial authorization to qualify for
IDS funding).
114. In reJ.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 12,616 S.E.2d 264,271 (2005).
115. Id.
116. State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 136, 362 S.E.2d 513, 522 (1987) (citing State v.
Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 82, 229 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1976)).
117. See State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 161, 513 S.E.2d 296, 302-03 (1999) (noting
also that the court will provide funds upon a threshold showing in accordance with Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), but that such a decision is to be made by the trial judge
under a totality of the circumstances test); see also State v. Seaberry, 97 N.C. App. 203,
207, 388 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1990) (noting that a lower court decision to deny expert
assistance "will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion").
118. See, e.g., Anderson, 350 N.C. at 163, 513 S.E.2d at 304 (affirming that the
defendant did not meet the threshold requiring the court to provide funds for a forensic
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In State v. Seaberry, 9 the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled
against a defendant seeking an independent ballistics expert to testify
for him during his trial on charges including assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill.1 2' The court emphasized that the ballistic
evidence was not the only evidence against the defendant and that
"[w]hile the ballistic expert's testimony may have been important for
the state to prove its case against Seaberry beyond a reasonable
doubt ... this fact alone is not sufficient to require the appointment
of an independent expert."'' In McNeill v. Branker,2 2 a United States
District Court judge rejected a defendant's argument that a state trial
court's denial of funding for a general forensic crime scene expert
violated due process.'23 The defense asserted that the State's case was
"circumstantial" and that a generalist, one who could analyze
multiple aspects of the case, was necessary to interpret the various
pieces of evidence the State sought to use.
124
Without passing judgment on whether the defendants in these
cases did or did not meet the required threshold for receiving
government funds for expert assistance, the high threshold itself
shows that while access to experts is automatic for the prosecution,
access for indigent defendants is far from guaranteed. 125 Moreover,
psychiatrist). But see State v. Jones, 344 N.C. 722, 727, 477 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1996) (holding
that the defendant had met the threshold requiring the court to provide funds for an
expert psychiatrist and ordering a new trial). The distinguishing characteristic between
Anderson and Jones was the type of defense the accused intended to raise. The Anderson
court noted that defendant did not intend to raise an insanity defense, 350 N.C. at 163, 513
S.E.2d at 304, whereas in Jones the defendant planned to assert a defense based on
diminished capacity, 344 N.C. at 726-27, 477 S.E.2d at 149.
119. 97 N.C. App. 203, 388 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
120. Id. at 210, 388 S.E.2d at 189.
121. Id.
122. 601 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
123. Id. at 725-27.
124. Id. at 727.
125. Encouragingly, though, the use of experts by indigent defendants is on the rise in
North Carolina. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERvs., EXPERT SPENDING STUDY: KEY
FINDINGS 1, 4 (2003), available athttp://www.ncids.org/Reports% 20&% 20Data/Prior
% 20Publications/03E xpertSpendingStudyKeyConclusions.pdf (showing a modest increase
in the percentage of indigent defense funds going toward experts even after accounting for
increases to keep pace with the annual growth of indigent defense cases). The study notes
that the rise is not due to an increase in total funding resources but rather reflects a "shift
of resources from attorneys to experts." Id. at 1. The study identified several factors
contributing to this shift, including the evolution of advanced forensic science such as
DNA typing; the professionalized work of experts due to greater use; the improved quality
of legal representation who employ experts strategically; and the fact that a shift
represents a "more efficient allocation of resources." Id. at 4. Interestingly, the study
highlights the importance of defense experts, stating that a shift in resources from attorney
fees to expert witnesses "has been beneficial or at least not harmful" with "fewer death
2011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
the funds that are provided may be inadequate and the experts
available to defendants less qualified.126 Because of this gap, the
problem of bias in the SBI Crime Lab is all the more troublesome:
When you learn that forensic science is not done by neutral
parties and you also learn that the poorest of people, the people
who cannot hire an independent group to do the science, have
to rely on law enforcement for their science, you become
extremely concerned. What this means and how this operates or
should operate in a system that presumes the innocence-not
the guilt-of a defendant is disturbing. But the very people who
are trying to put that accused in jail are the people who control
the science.127
While greater access to experts for indigent defendants is
necessary, the use of private sector labs for the State's forensic
investigation will help in the absence of such access. This proposal
will not make the lab under contract with the State available to the
defense for its own testing requests at the State's expense. It ensures,
however, that where the defense cannot afford independent testing,
the tests that are done are less subject to prosecutorial bias. At the
very least, poor defendants will have access to evidence reviewed by
analysts who are not directly employed by the State that is seeking to
convict them.128 Phil Kohn, a Las Vegas public defender, made the
same point in a media interview regarding the city's crime lab, noting
that his office spends $1,000 per request to duplicate testing done by
the prosecutor's lab.129
sentences and more not guilty verdicts/dismissals/[sic] or mistrial dispositions" during the
prior three years. Id.
126. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 4.02. Judge Jack Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York has found that the lack of qualified experts causes him
to adjust his approach to admissibility. Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of
Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1998) ("I try to reflect
before criticizing any expert because it may be that the party could not afford a better
expert, or that the other side may have already monopolized all of the 'top people' in the
field. So we tend, in our role as Daubert gatekeepers in the courtroom, to be rather
flexible about allowing less-than-Nobel-laureates to testify. My own tendency is to allow
admission rather freely, and then rule on a motion for a new trial, dismissal, or to strike
the testimony.").
127. Symposium, supra note 4, at 418 (quoting criminal defense lawyer William
Moffitt).
128. Cf id. (lamenting that the "people who control the science" are the ones seeking
to convict the defendant).
129. Steve Kanigher, Is Independent Crime Lab the Right Move for Metro?, LAS




In life and death cases, we always give testing a second look to
make sure there aren't errors. But I would be more comfortable
in everyday cases if I had the same access to the lab that the
district attorney has. It would be a lot better for everyone if we
had one lab we could all use and it would save us money in the
long run.130
For such a system to work, however, the independent lab must be
equally responsive to both defense and prosecuting attorneys with
regard to the reporting results. 3 ' The Forensic Sciences Act of 2011
sought to bolster procedures for providing defendants with law
enforcement files by adding that test results, lab notes, preliminary
tests, and screening results must be provided.' While the amended
language makes the duty to share this information more explicit, it
does nothing to expand the duty that only arises upon a defendant's
motion to the court. 33
Standard procedures for making results available to defense
attorneys would further the Forensic Sciences Act's stated purpose-
to "serve the public and the criminal justice system."'' 34 The Supreme
Court in Brady v. Maryland135 found that prosecutors have a
130. Id.
131. The SBI Crime Lab's website now states, "Lab analysts have been and remain
accessible to all verified attorneys who wish to ask questions about tests performed and to
visit with analysts for pre-trial conferences." Crime Lab, supra note 40. This language
comes from the first report of the ombudsman to the SBI Crime Lab, which recommended
reiterating the accessibility of the SBI's analysts and posting it on the website.
OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 7. The report states that any attorney of record
in a case may contact lab counsel for access. Id. Despite this statement implying that lab
analysts have always been available to the defense, the SBI audit found that by stated
policyequal access "to all verified attorneys" was not the norm. SWECKER & WOLF, supra
note 21, at 13. Still, this new language is encouraging and, hopefully, will be implemented
in practice. See also Giannelli, supra note 13, at 473-74 (noting that scientific reports
should be turned over to the defense). Giannelli argues that not only should the services of
the lab be made available to the defense but that any reports prepared for the State ought
to be given to the court and the defense automatically without regard to discovery. Id. The
National Research Council took similar issue with a system that is not available to defense
counsel: "Forensic science serves more than just law enforcement; and when it does serve
law enforcement, it must be equally available to law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
and defendants in the criminal justice system." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT'L ACADS., supra note 24, at 17. Defense attorneys, too, must get better; too often,
they do not understand the scientific evidence at the heart of the case. See Koppl, supra
note 4, at 265-66. Even when the lawyer is competent, a successful challenge to a State's
expert requires a defense expert's opposing take. Id. at 266.
132. Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, sec. 9, § 15A-903, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38,
41 (LexisNexis).
133. Id.
134. Forensic Sciences Act of2011, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 38 (LexisNexis).
135. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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constitutional duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense
"where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."'' 3 6
Even where the defense does not make a request or makes a broad
request for exculpatory materials, the prosecutor must disclose
anything that is of an "obviously exculpatory character."'37 While lab
employees are not prosecutors themselves, under the current
structure, the lab likely violates the Constitution if it withholds
information from prosecutors who then cannot practically make that
information available to the defense. This is because "[a]ny
information in the files or possession of an investigative agency is
deemed to be in the possession of the Prosecutor."'38 Thus, as long as
the SBI Crime Lab remains a state operation, the analysts employed
by the lab have a constitutional duty to report negative, exculpatory
results. The State should take charge by creating procedures or
amending existing laws so that this constitutional duty may be
routinely carried out. 13 9 The materials should be as freely available to
the defense as they are to the prosecution for the lab to truly be
considered a servant of the criminal justice system as a whole. 40
III. PULLING BACK THE REINS THROUGH OVERSIGHT AND
REGULATION
The reforms discussed thus far, particularly a move to private
labs, cannot exist without a structure in place to ensure that proper
procedures are followed and problems identified and addressed as
they arise. Mandatory accreditation by a reputable accrediting body
and oversight by a state regulatory body will protect against the
problems discussed in Part II.
136. Id. at 87; see also infra note 167 and accompanying text (outlining the
constitutional duty of turning over evidence under Brady).
137. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
138. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 8.
139. Prosecutors may need to be educated on their duties. One North Carolina
attorney wrote that prosecutors are ill-equipped to properly carry out discovery. William
W. G errans, The History of the Exposure of SBI Overreaching from a Defense Perspective,
TRUE BILL, Sept. 2010, at 5, 6 (noting that prosecutors "seem unaware that Brady
material goes beyond exculpatory evidence and includes impeachment evidence or that
NC law requires disclosure with enough time to 'effectively use' it at trial").
140. In addition, the State should institute contemporaneous recordation of laboratory
procedures so that defense attorneys can adequately follow what was done by analysts and
so that evidence like that in the Taylor case-subsequent laboratory results which never




The primary accrediting company for crime laboratories in the
United States is the American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board ("ASCLD"), a not-for-
profit board... that accredits 25 private laboratories, 23 federal
laboratories, 132 local laboratories, and 193 state laboratories,
including the SBI Crime Lab. 42 The revelations of misconduct and
other improper practices at the SBI Crime Lab, however, have led to
inquiries into the rigor of the ASCLD accreditation process and
intimations of improper conflicts of interest. 143 For example, ASCLD
is headquartered a few miles away from the main SBI lab and is led
by former SBI officials.'" Both the current executive director of the
accrediting agency and its international program manager worked for
the SBI during at least part of the time when the problematic
procedures for reporting test results were in place.'45 The group's
accreditation arm also shares office space with its for-profit consulting
group that helps labs attain accreditation.'46 Still, despite the apparent
shortcomings of ASCLD in its oversight of the SBI Crime Lab,
accreditation is a necessary requirement for a forensic lab handling
evidence for the State and should be combined with government
oversight.
Most laboratories seek accreditation voluntarily, and only a
handful of states, including North Carolina, require accreditation.
147
141. History of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB), AM. SOC'Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. LAB.
ACCREDITATION BD., http://www.ascld-lab.org/about-us/history.html (last visited Nov.
12,2011).
142. See ASCLD/LAB Accredited Laboratories, AM. SOC'Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS.
LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., http://www.ascld-lab.org/labstatus/accreditedlabs.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011). ASCLD currently requires accredited labs to undergo inspections
in the disciplines in which the lab provides services that are covered by the accrediting
body, an annual audit, re-accreditation every five years, and proficiency testing.
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 89, at 19.
143. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Inspectors Missed All SBI Faults, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/26
/648075/inspectors-missed-all-sbi-faults.html; Joseph Neff & Mandy Locke, Forensic
Groups' Ties Raise Concerns, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Oct. 13, 2010), http://
www.newsobserver.com/2010/09/26/703376/forensic-groups-ties-raise-concerns.html.
144. Locke & Neff, supra note 143.
145. Neff & Locke, supra note 143; ASCLD/LAB OfFice Staff, AM. SOC'Y OF CRIME
LAB. DIRS. LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., http://www.ascld-lab.org/staff.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2011).
146. Neff& Locke, supra note 143.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.20(b) (2009), amended byForensic Sciences Act of 2011,
sec. 7, § 8-58.20, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 40 (LexisNexis); Giannelli, supra note
74, at 212. Other states requiring accreditation in at least some circumstances (for
2011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
Still, not all labs endeavor to meet this standard with county labs less
likely to seek accreditation than state labs. 4'
The accrediting body must be reputable. While ASCLD is well-
known and widely used-it accredited over seventy percent of labs
nationwide in 200514 9 -North Carolina ought to re-examine its use of
ASCLD in light of the potential conflicts of interest and failures of
oversight that allowed the problems at the SBI Crime Lab to persist.
The use of A SCLD in this state was so entrenched that it was, until
the recent passage of the Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, prescribed by
law. State evidentiary law formerly required that for forensic analysis
to be admissible, it had to "be performed in accordance with rules or
procedures adopted by the State Bureau of Investigation, or by
another laboratory accredited by the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board
(ASCLD/LAB) for the submission, identification, analysis, and
storage of forensic analyses."' 5° The recent revision to statutory law
was needed to infuse flexibility into the choice of the accrediting
body. 1' Now, the State must use that flexibility to re-evaluate
whether ASCLD is the right choice.
example, for DNA testing or when private labs are used) include Hawaii, Missouri, New
York, and Wyoming. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 844D-51, -54 (LexisNexis 2007)
(requiring accreditation by ASCLD); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 650.060 (West Supp. 2011) ("On
or after December 31, 2012, any crime laboratory providing reports or testimony to a state
court pertaining to a result of the forensic analysis of evidence shall be accredited ....");
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b (McKinney 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-306 (1996)
(requiring accreditation when private labs are used as a substitute to the state crime lab).
148. DUROSE, supra note 89, at 3.
149. Id. As North Carolina's situation shows, the most common accreditation board is
not necessarily the right board. Chris Swecker, one of the authors of the SBI audit, told
the NEWS & OBSERVER that he began the audit considering ASCLD to be the "gold
standard," but came away finding it a "minimum standard." Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff,
Legislators: SBI Needs New Accrediting Agency, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Sept. 17,2010, at IA, available athttp://www.newsobserver.com/2010/09/17/685970
/legislators-sbi-needs-new-accrediting.html; see also Janine Arvizu, Forensic Labs:
ShatteringtheMyth, CHAMPION, May 2000, at 18, 20, available athttp://www.nlada.org
/forensics/forlib/D ocuments/1107453386.76/90ded0ef~fb5abeO85256982004eb8P/ 3FOpe
nD ocument% 26H ighlight% 3D0% 2Ceyewitness (noting that ASCLD's accreditation
program, though the only national program available, is "neither a technically strong, nor
a truly independent program").
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.20(b).
151. In addition to accreditation requirements, the Forensic Sciences Act of 2011 took
the positive step of requiring certification of lab analysts to ensure that the analysts meet
the proper qualifications for their positions. § 4, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 39-40.
This change, too, should remain in place for private sector employees that work on state
cases. Moreover, judges should consider certification or lack thereof when determining
whether or not a person may testify as an expert, effectively ensuring certification of
anyone who works on evidence in a police case. As it is now, judges are often lenient with
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Despite the shortfalls of ASCLD with regard to the SBI Crime
Lab, North Carolina was right to require accreditation in the first
place. Under a system that utilizes private sector labs, this
requirement should remain. Accreditation serves as a first line of
defense against sloppy or improper methods.'52  The use of
unaccredited labs increases the risk of faulty science making it into
the courtroom. West Virginia's lab was not accredited during the
period when Fred Zain worked there.'53 More recently in 2002, the
practices of an unaccredited lab in Texas came under fire, resulting in
the lab's closure and the reopening of hundreds of cases.'54
Accreditation, however, is only one safeguard and is not fool-
proof, as the SBI Crime Lab scandal has demonstrated.
"[A]ccreditation does not mean that accredited laboratories do not
make mistakes nor does it mean that a laboratory utilizes best
practices in every case . . . ."'I' Accreditation also may not prevent
biased analysts from committing intentional misconduct.'56 Still,
accreditation is indispensible. Accreditors set the standard at which a
whom they consider an expert in the courtroom. For example, with regard to blood
analysts, the type at issue in North Carolina, courts across the country are generous with
the expert label. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 944. "[C]ourts have held
that a witness can acquire this expertise solely through experience; academic training is
unnecessary. The standard of admissibility is relatively lax . I..." Id. Moreover, the less
scientific background a forensic worker has, the more bias the worker is likely to allow to
seep into his or her work, overcoming scientific objectivity. See Andre A. Moenssens,
Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6-7 (1993). Pro-prosecution bias is greater among technicians-those
who have been trained to perform certain tests but are not themselves scientists. Id. These
technicians are often called on to testify as expert witnesses. Id.
152. Either through the accrediting agency or on their own, labs should implement a
quality assurance program. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 89, at 17 ("The credibility of
the forensic laboratory and its scientists rests on the quality of their work product.
Forensic scientists must be scientifically knowledgeable, technically skilled, objective and
ethical. Laboratory procedures must be scientifically sound and carried out according to
good laboratory practices. Written reports and testimony must be scientifically correct yet
comprehensible to a lay audience. A strong quality assurance program is an essential
foundation-and a necessary 'cost of doing business'--for any forensic laboratory."). The
program, as imagined by the writers of the report, would cover staff training and
qualifications; administrative policies; quality control checks of equipment; and review of
casework, reports, and testimony. Id. at 18.
153. In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 508 (W. Va. 1993) (directing the lab to seek accreditation within sixty days and
finding that the "corruption of our legal system would not have occurred had there been
adequate controls and procedures").
154. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 89, at 17.
155. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 24, at 195.
156. Id. at 197 ("Accreditation cannot guarantee high quality-that is, it cannot guard
against those who intentionally disobey or ignore requirements."). For a discussion of bias
and intentional misconduct, see supra Part N.A.
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lab should operate and can identify problematic practices early if
accreditors are doing their jobs properly.
B. Consistency in the Lab and in the Courts Through Uniform
Standards
Instituting regulation in an almost regulation-free industry,'1
7
however, must go beyond merely requiring accreditation by any of
several accrediting bodies, which may vary in the standards and best
practices that they promote. Accrediting boards are free to set their
own standards, and ASCLD only recently began to examine its
practices in relation to international standards.'58 As an example of
how individual accrediting board standards might fall short, until 2004
ASCLD had no written guidelines regarding reporting lab results.'59
Some of the problems associated with the SBI Crime Lab's serology
unit, such as the practice of withholding negative confirmatory tests
for blood from final reports, might have been avoided with the proper
guidelines.
Several options exist as to what government body, new or
existing, ought to be responsible for creating guidelines in North
Carolina. The newly created Forensic Science Advisory Board
6
1
could fill the role of creating best standards and practices for use by
private labs and the accrediting agency used by those labs.' 6' The
Board and a new ombudsman position are already charged with
making recommendations of this type to the SBI Crime Lab's
director, but the Board's duties and authority could be expanded.
New York, for example, employs an independent commission to act
as accreditor, setting standards and qualifications.'62 Another option
may be a forensic science institution jointly operated by a medical
school and a law school. 63 The congressional committee charged with
examining the nation's forensic science issues recommends the
157. Giannelli, supra note 13, at 474.
158. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 28 (noting that the SBI Crime Lab has been
"grandfathered" in and can use old guidelines until 2013).
159. Id. at 17.
160. Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, §2, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 38
(LexisNexis).
161. At the very least, the State should actively examine the standards promoted by
accrediting bodies in determining which ought to be used.
162. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 228-29.
163. Paul J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance ofDaubert to Criminal Justice and Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, Sl13 (2005) ("[T]he synergy of law
and medicine would enhance the development and implementation of appropriate
standards and controls for reporting scientific results in writing and in court.").
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creation of a national agency called the National Institute of Forensic
Science. 1" Whatever route is taken, the body charged with creating
such standards should also investigate and address misconduct and
error.165 Under the current law in North Carolina, the new Board has
authority to review lab reports and conclusions only upon the request
of the lab director.'66 The Board should also conduct regular audits
aimed at uncovering problems in their infancy.
Promulgated standards could directly address the problems
identified at the SBI Crime Lab. For example, Greg Taylor's case
may have turned out very differently had the SBI Crime Lab
operated under strict report writing guidelines that required the
disclosure of subsequent negative test results for the presence of
blood. The opposite policy, which was in full force at the SBI Crime
Lab for years, is unethical and also a likely violation of the
Constitution and the rules of evidence.
167
The institution of scientific best practices also may have helped
the SBI Crime Lab avoid the issues that led to the recent scandal. In
the area of serology analysis, the use of presumptive tests for the
presence of blood is common practice. Perhaps the most well-known
example of presumptive testing is the use of luminol at crime
scenes. 168 With these presumptive tests, "a negative result is almost
164. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 24, at 19.
165. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 76, at 3. In addition, the Justice Project report
recommends that such commissions include members "from inside and outside the
forensic establishment and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system, including
prosecutors and defense attorneys with expertise in forensic evidence." Id.
166. Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, §2, 2011-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 38, 39
(LexisNexis).
167. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 12. For example, the United States Supreme
Court requires the government to turn over evidence that is material to the outcome,
favorable to the defense, or exculpatory--categories that certainly include test results
contradicting the government's case. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also 1
NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL §4.6 (2004) (discussing Brady material).
Moreover, the state's rules of professional conduct require similar action by prosecutors.
N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007) (requiring prosecutors to
disclose evidence that "tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense").
None of these rules require the defense to make a motion before the duty to disclose
arises despite the requirement for the disclosure of other prosecutorial records. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2009) (requiring the court to order the prosecution to fulfill their
duty and turn over such materials upon the defense's motion), amended by Forensic
Sciences Act of 2011 § 9, An Act to Strengthen North Carolina's Open-File Discovery
Law, Protect Crime Stoppers Informants, Protect Victim Information, Require Law
Enforcement and Investigatory Agencies to Make Timely Disclosure of Their Files to
Prosecutors, and Avoid Frivolous Claims of Professional Misconduct Against Prosecutors,
sec. 1, § 15A-903, 2011-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 294 (LexisNexis).
168. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 17.04 (noting that luminol is most
popular). Despite its tendency to result in false positives, luminol may come to juries with
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conclusive evidence that blood is absent."'69 However, false positives
are not uncommon and have been reported with samples from a
variety of everyday items.17 The SBI training manual itself prescribes
that presumptive tests "should not be judged as a confirmation of the
presence of blood" and that they are only to be used together with
confirmatory tests if enough of a blood sample is available.17" '
The SBI audit summarizes the importance of serology analysis in
criminal cases:
[T]he mere presence of human blood on a suspect or an object
associated with a suspect can be powerful evidence for the
prosecution in a criminal investigation. Conversely, the absence
of evidence of such a transfer or the absence of bodily fluid,
especially blood, on a suspect can be favorable and even
material, to the defense of an accused defendant. 7 '
Thus, the presence or absence of blood can determine the outcome of
a trial.
173
While reporting guidelines would address many of the problems
associated with the SBI's serology unit, 7 4 the number of tests
available and the varying reliability of those tests, in serology and
other disciplines, warrants standards for the testing itself. 75 In 2003,
the SBI Crime Lab discontinued use of the confirmatory test relied
on (but not reported) in the Taylor case, known as the Takayama test,
in favor of DNA testing and other more accurate tests, such as the
Rapid Stain Identification test. 176 Regulatory standards should require
the most accurate and reliable technology, and regulators should
a gloss of reliability given its extensive appearance on popular television shows like CS1.
See JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 91(2009).
169. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 17.04.
170. Id (noting that presumptive tests may react positively with "samples from apple,
cabbage, radish, grass, lettuce, celery, potato, tomato, corn, onion, rust, and bleach"); see
also SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 15 (noting that, similar to luminol, another
presumptive test, the Kastle-Meyer test, reacts positively to common plants like tomatoes
and turnips).
171. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 34.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Again, defense attorneys must have routine access to materials disclosing the
outcome of all tests performed by lab analysts so they can utilize the results at trial. See
supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
174. The analysts actually were conducting "subsequent confirmatory tests" but were
not always reporting the results. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 3.
175. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 17.04 (discussing different
presumptive and confirmatory tests for blood).
176. SWECKER & WOLF, supra note 21, at 27.
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regularly review and update the standards to keep pace with scientific
advances.
The evolution of quality assurance in DNA analysis can serve as
a model to regulators in other forensic science disciplines. In 1989, the
FBI formed a group with members hailing from DNA labs
nationwide to form guidelines for DNA analysis.'77 Labs now must
follow FBI guidelines and quality assurance protocols in order to
have access to CODIS, the FBI's DNA database.'78 Similar groups
have formed to create guidelines in other forensic areas such as
fingerprint and bloodstain pattern analyses. 79 The standards already
promulgated by these groups could be adopted at the state level
regardless of whether the lab intends to seek access to any federal
databases. Again, the state organization should conduct frequent
audits like those required by the FBI's quality assurance program. 80
Finally, beyond improving laboratory operations, uniformity in
standards and guidelines will aid inside the courtroom as judges
struggle to perform their gatekeeper function with respect to expert
testimony and evidence.18" ' The two primary tests for admissibility are
the general acceptance test from Frye v. United States'82 and the
current federal standard outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,"'83 codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.184 Both
177. DOJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
178. Id. at 16.
179. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 89, at 22.
180. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 21 (detailing the creation of a DNA audit
guide to be followed by auditors of local, state, and federal labs). The FBI, of course, has
not been immune to the ills of the forensic science system in the United States,
demonstrating again that standards alone will not solve the problem of intentional
misconduct. In 2002, the FBI discovered that one of its analysts, Jacqueline Blake, omitted
important and required control tests in the DNA testing protocol and falsified lab reports
to conceal her actions. Id. at i-ii. The creation of an oversight commission, in conjunction
with standards and a move toward independent labs, will help to minimize and eliminate
the instances of rogue employees. The United States DOJ recommended updating the
testing protocols, rewriting them to eliminate vagueness, and enhancing note-taking
requirements, among other things, in response to the Blake scandal. Id. at 120-26.
181. See Neufeld, supra note 163, at S109 (describing the ineffectiveness of the Daubert
standard in keeping out questionable forensic testimony in criminal cases).
182. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule as stated in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
183. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
184. FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring for the admission of expert testimony that "(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case"). The rule was amended to its current state in 2000 in
response to Daubert. Id. advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
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require the judge to weigh the reliability of expert testimony."i 5 Yet,
more than two decades after Daubert, observers have noted that few
criminal defendants challenge scientific testimony and that criminal
defendants rarely win their challenges. I"6 Moreover, when it comes to
important blood evidence, for example, it seems that almost anything
will pass muster. As one commentator explains, "The courts liberally
admit testimony on the threshold question of whether material is
blood. Some courts even declare that no expertise is necessary to
identify blood and, hence, that lay opinion is permissible on that
subject." '187
While important screening of evidence is not taking place in
Daubert jurisdictions, the situation is even more dire in North
Carolina, where the Supreme Court of North Carolina has adopted a
more lax standard. North Carolina courts employ a three-prong test
that requires that the expert utilize sufficiently reliable methods; the
expert be qualified in the area; and the testimony be relevant.188
Though this standard on its face is similar to Daubert, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has forcefully rejected the view that the state
had implicitly adopted the federal standard, holding that North
Carolina's "approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than
the 'exacting standards of reliability' demanded by the federal
185. The Frye test requires that the technique or scientific principle upon which
admissible expert testimony is based "must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 293 F. at 1014.
186.
An analysis of post-Daubert decisions demonstrates that whereas civil defendants
prevail in their Daubert challenges, most of the time criminal defendants almost
always lose their challenges to government proffers. But when the prosecutor
challenges a criminal defendant's expert evidence, the evidence is almost always
kept out of the trial.... And even though Frye remains the test in more than a
dozen states, criminal defendants fared no better under Frye.
Neufeld, supra note 163, at S109 (footnote omitted). Neufeld faulted both lawyers and
judges in his discussion of varying standards of admissibility and the failures that have
resulted despite Daubert. Id. at S1 10. In describing the difficulties in determining whether
or not a person testifying as an expert actually has the credentials and expertise required,
one judge noted that there may be another solution to the "lack of scientific knowledge on
the bench." Weinstein, supra note 126, at 1017. He states that "professional scientific and
medical societies must take a more active role in policing members of their professions
who testify as experts and must do more to ensure honesty and professionalism among
expert witnesses." Id. Another suggestion is that judges take into account observer
effects-the bias resulting from lab employees seeing themselves as an arm of the
prosecution-when making a reliability determination. Risinger et al., supra note 80, at 54.
187. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 17.04.
188. State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527-29, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-41 (1995).
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approach."1"9 The court in Howerton v. AraiHelmet, Ltd.9 wanted to
avoid putting judges "in the onerous and impractical position of
passing judgment on the substantive merits of the scientific or
technical theories undergirding an expert's opinion."'' The court
seemed determined in Howerton to remove judges from the role of
gatekeeper altogether. 92 Furthermore, Howerton may have gone so
far as to shift to opponents of evidence the heavy burden of
demonstrating its unreliability.' 93 This lack of rigorous review may
allow the admission of fundamentally unreliable evidence. 94
In those jurisdictions where gatekeeping is still a judicial
function, uniform standards and procedures could aid judges in
properly determining the reliability of scientific evidence. In North
Carolina, absent a reversal of course from Howerton, a set of best
practices would serve a different purpose-acting as a failsafe and
blunting the effect of a lackluster legal standard. If judges do not
protect defendants on the back end from improper evidence, then
evidence offered by the State must be highly reliable on the front
end.
95
189. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 464, 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (2004)
(quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440,455 (2000)).
190. 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674(2004).
191. Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
192. See Kenneth S. Broun, Scientific Evidence in North Carolina Afier Howerton-A
Presumption ofAdmissibility?, N.C. ST. B.J., Spring 2005, at 8, 10 ("The only references to
'gatekeeping' in Howerton are pejorative."). The state of affairs regarding the
admissibility of scientific evidence in North Carolina post-Howerton could be the subject
of a comment in its own right. In fact, after the ruling, scholars were not sure what to make
of it. Id. at 10-11 ("[T]he boundaries of the standard for admissibility are still very much
open."); see MARTIN S. KAUFMAN, ATL. LEGAL FOUND., THE STATUS OF DAUBERTIN
STATE COURTS 3, 35-36 (2006) (categorizing North Carolina as having neither rejected
nor accepted Daubert, despite the repudiation in Howerton).
193. Broun, supra note 192, at 12. ("Judges are not to weigh the scientific merit of the
evidence on each side. The burden is not only on the opponent to negate the reliability of
the testimony. Arguably, based upon the Court's language in Howerton, the burden on the
opponent of the evidence is a heavy one-to clearly establish the lack of scientific merit in
the evidence.").
194. Id. at 12. Professor Broun points to State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370
(1984), a well-known North Carolina example of junk science being admitted where it
might have been discovered under a Daubert review. See Broun, supra note 192, at 12. In
that case, Dr. Louise Robbins testified that a bloody footprint belonged to the defendant,
and the court admitted the testimony after a review under the factors later announced in
Goode. Id. Her techniques, however, had been contradicted by defense experts and were
later thoroughly debunked. Bullard, 312 N.C. at 154, 322 S.E.2d at 384-85; Broun, supra
note 192, at 12.
195. See Neufeld, supra note 163, at S109, Slll (discussing this idea in terms of
jurisdictions where defendants, despite Daubert or Frye, rarely win challenges to the
admissibility of scientific evidence). "The judicial process has failed to provide obligatory
controls to ensure the fairness of the proceeding. If the courts cannot be relied on for this
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While tightening the legal standard of admissibility in North
Carolina might be wise, ultimately, broader, non-legal reforms
provide the best opportunity to address the problems inherent in the
current system. Legal reforms, for example, would not solve the
problem of the indigent defendant who may not have an attorney
competent to challenge admissibility.'96 An approach that prioritizes
reform of the labs themselves and also addresses problems inherent in
the law is, of course, ideal.197
IV. ADDRESSING SOME CONCERNS
While independence and use of private sector labs would solve
many of the problems associated with the SBI Crime Lab, these
reforms are not without potential pitfalls. This Part addresses the
concerns of cost, profit-motive, legal, and constitutional issues, as well
as law enforcement personnel's fears that a private lab would inhibit
their ability to conduct effective investigations.
A. Cost
Local law enforcement agencies that utilize private labs to fulfill
some of their needs often face increased costs, sometimes paying out-
of-pocket for lab services that would otherwise be free to them if
provided by a state lab. These increased costs, however, would not
accompany a statewide system that regularly uses private labs for all
of its testing needs. The funds now devoted to the state lab would be
diverted to local agencies for use in contracting out for those services.
Furthermore, by using private laboratories, the State would save
protection, other remedies must be found further 'upstream' so that the disreputable
evidence is never proffered." Id. at SI 1.
196. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 181 ("While stricter standards for admitting scientific
evidence benefit only those who can afford to mount an effective legal challenge to
questionable scientific evidence, broader reforms benefit even the most impecunious
defendants."). The National Research Council's report also advocates for broader reform,
finding that the lack of scientific expertise on the bench, the lack of time and resources,
and the deferential nature of appellate review means that "[t]he adversarial process ... is
not suited to the task of finding 'scientific truth.'" NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT'L ACADS., supra note 24, at 11-12. The report argues that "[j]udicial review, by itself,
will not cure the infirmities of the forensic science community." Id. at 12. Examples of
both approaches to reform exist in other countries. For example, Canada and Australia
have sought to reduce the admission of junk science by revamping their evidentiary rules,
while England has tackled its problems through non-law reforms such as restructuring its
lab. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 181.
197. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 181 ("Of course, there is no reason a jurisdiction could
not have what may amount to the best of both worlds - English-style broad reform of the
forensic science system and stricter rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
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money through increased competition for the State as a client and
through economies of scale.198 The current structure, where a lab's
size is tied to the size of the jurisdiction it serves, prevents effective
economies of scale as labs are less flexible to respond to the needs of
the market at large. 99 With healthy competition in the private sector,
then, labs will compete for state contracts on cost, as well as quality.
200
Moreover, contracting out government services has historically
yielded cost-savings: "[P]rivate profit-seeking entrepreneurs have
strong incentives to monitor costs and avoid unnecessarily expensive
means of production, perhaps in order to increase profits, but more
importantly to attract and keep customers in the face of competitive
alternatives."2"' Though data is lacking in the forensic science
industry, studies have repeatedly shown that private ownership of
firms in general can create cost-savings over state ownership.2 2
A network of private labs also would reduce the cost of national
regulation, should Congress go that route:
Forensic labs are currently under the jurisdiction of local
governments, which may adopt policies different from those the
national government might choose. Privatization would open
the way for national regulations. Privatization would reduce the
cost of national regulation and, therefore, of intervention at the
198. See Koppl, supra note 4, at 272. Koppl also argues that a competitive private
system would serve as more than a cost-cutting measure, creating "the advantage of
turning the entrepreneurial discovery process loose in the forensic laboratories of the
criminal justice system." Id.; see also BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT:
PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35-40 (1998) (describing how
privatization in other areas of criminal justice may enhance the quality of services). This
Comment does not, however, argue that other areas of criminal justice, such as prisons or
police, ought to be privatized as those areas present their own unique issues.
199. Koppl, supra note 4, at 272; see also BENSON, supra note 198, at 33-34.
200. Koppl, supra note 4, at 273. Koppl quoted Benson as saying that a "firm with a
reputation for providing lower quality than expected may not be in business for very long,
if competitive alternatives are available." Id. (quoting BENSON, supra note 198, at 35). The
concern that the State will select a private lab based on the test results it produces is
addressed in Part III, supra. The concern that private labs' motive to profit from this
system will lead to manipulated test results to please the State is addressed in Part IV.B,
infra.
201. BENSON, supra note 198, at 30. Benson also notes that private firms can save
money on labor and through the flexibility they have that governments cannot match. Id.
at 30-31.
202. Megginson & Netter, supra note 75, at 332-37 (summarizing empirical research
comparing efficiencies of private firms versus public firms around the world). One study in
particular of international airlines found that "private ownership leads to higher rates of
productivity growth and declining costs in the long run ...." Id. at 334. In particular, one
study found that the differences do not depend on the degree of competition in the
marketplace. Id.
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national level. Interventions that impose national standards and
protocols would be easier under privatization. °3
Additionally, the costs of sticking to the status quo are
substantial. With a scandal, the State ends up paying in more than just
reputation. In West Virginia, following the revelations of misconduct
by its serologist, Zain, the state's highest court directed that whenever
an individual sought habeas relief on an issue related to Zain, the
court would identify an independent laboratory to conduct DNA
testing at the government's expense." Costs also add up by way of
overturned convictions, payments of restitution, and new trials, not to
mention the general cost of imprisoning people who should not be in
prison.
B. Motive to Profit Replacing the Motive to Convict
The profit-seeking nature of private firms, however, presents
another concern: the money brought in by having state or local
governments as a client may simply replace the desire to convict as a
motivational problem, with the defendants losing either way.2 °5 With
the proper safeguards in place, however, such pitfalls may be avoided.
Any shift to the private sector must be accompanied by regulations
that specify standards of practice, guard against corruption and bad
actors,2"6 and promote quality control.2 7 This means the creation of
an oversight mechanism, mandatory accreditation, and regular
audits."8 North Carolina's new Forensic Science Advisory Board
could provide this oversight if its powers are expanded beyond merely
recommending action to the lab's director.20 9 The General Assembly
could also take a cue from Senator Patrick Leahy's bill pending in the
203. Koppl, supra note 4, at 272.
204. In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 507 (W. Va. 1993).
205. Koppl, supra note 4, at 273.
206. Of course, cheating and corruption are possible regardless of the system in place.
State oversight will work if the State takes its oversight role seriously. At some point,
however, the public has to rely on the fact that the government will enforce its own laws
and regulations.
207. Koppl, supra note 4, at 272-73; see also BENSON, supra note 198, at 44-46
(discussing the effect of corruption in a private system).
208. Koppl, supra note 4, at 273 ("Poorly designed 'privatization' may replace a
government bureaucracy with a profit-seeking monopoly. This type of privatization should
be avoided .... If, however, privatization of police forensics is combined with rivairous
redundancy [and] statistical review .... then it has considerable potential to raise
standards and lower costs.").




United States Senate and include lawyers on the Board to provide a
legal perspective. 210 The ombudsman created by the new North
Carolina law also could play an important role as a check on the
government in its regulation of private labs. 211 Under a system of
private labs and government regulation, an ombudsman will be
essential to ensuring that the regulatory body charged with oversight
takes the actions necessary to accomplish its goals and responds to
issues as they arise.212
Ultimately the question may be whether a motive to profit is
worse than a motive to convict. This Comment argues that the latter
is, in fact, worse. Those who will commit scientific fraud in order to
increase profits will have far more hoops to jump through to justify
their behavior as moral, let alone legal. This is corruption, and with
corruption, governments can only institute safeguards to try to
prevent and catch bad actors. When prosecutorial bias takes root,
however, this motivation leads those affected to believe that what
they are doing is right-that they are serving the cause of justice when
in fact they are obstructing it. And this bias has been found in the
public forensic science system time and time again. This systemic
problem is far more dangerous because it is far less obvious to
outsiders that something is wrong. For corrupt lab officials actively
breaking the law without regard to guilt, innocence, or legal
ramifications in order to line their own pockets, criminal punishment
is the best response.
210. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 112th Cong.
§ 102(b)(3)-(4) (2011).
211. Cf Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1629, 1654-56 (2011) (noting that ombudsman offices can take on the role of contrarians
with respect to financial regulation, serving as a check on agencies and "counteracting
regulatory inaction"). The ombudsman position was created to "ensure all processes,
procedures, practices, and protocols at the Laboratory are consistent with State and
federal law, best forensic law practices, and in the best interests of justice in this State."
Forensic Sciences Act of 2011 § 6(a). The ombudsman's duties include acting as a
mediator between the SBI Crime Lab and defense attorneys, prosecutors, law
enforcement officers, and the public. Id. The ombudsman will "make recommendations on
a regular basis to the Director of the State Crime Laboratory, Director of the SBI, and
Attorney General of North Carolina" to ensure that the SBI Crime Lab's practices and
procedures comply with state and federal law and the best forensic practices. Id. The
ombudsman's recommendations to the Attorney General and SBI officials are to
incorporate the "meritorious systemic complaints" his office receives. Id.
212. Cf McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 211, at 1655-56 (describing the duties of
the ombudsman to the Internal Revenue Service, including proposing legislative changes
and reporting the agency's shortcomings to Congress). Similarly, the ombudsman to the
SBI Crime Lab, the Forensic Science Advisory Board, or whatever body assumes
oversight of private labs can actively identify potential problems and report to the state
legislature when improvements can be made.
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C. Constitutional and Legal Concerns
Other concerns with a private system, including fears that private
firms would raise Confrontation Clause and chain of custody issues,
could also be addressed through a set of standards and practices.
213
The United States Supreme Court declared in 2009 in Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachuset&4 that scientific analysts must be available to testify
to their work.2 5 The Court rejected the argument that analysts should
be exempt (and, thus, their reports allowed to speak for themselves)
because their testimony consists of "neutral, scientific testing."2"6 The
Court held that the Confrontation Clause was one necessary way to
challenge scientific evidence and that it plays a crucial role in
"weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent
one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic
evidence used in criminal trials." '217 North Carolina, too, recognized
the important role of confrontation when it expressly adopted the
Melendez-Diaz holding in State v. Locklea~t and later cases.2"9 While
the Confrontation Clause is an important constitutional safeguard,
any concern that private labs will be unable to comply with its
requirements is unfounded. Compliance would be a condition of the
contract. If an out-of-state lab would be unable to guarantee its
analysts' availability to testify in a North Carolina case, then the out-
of-state lab would be ineligible for state contracts. The fact that
private labs already perform work for criminal investigations also
belies any claim that they cannot adhere to appropriate legal
standards.
20
213. For information on the Confrontation Clause and chain of custody in general, see
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, §§ 6.04, 7.01-7.05.
214. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
215. Id. at 2542 (holding that the admission of certificates, which found the evidence in
question to be cocaine, signed by state analysts violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses against him).
216. Id. at 2536.
217. Id. at 2537. Of course, successful confrontation of forensic evidence requires a
competent defense attorney as well.
218. 363 N.C. 438, 681 S.E.2d 293 (2009).
219. Id. at 452, 681 S.E.2d at 304-05 (holding that autopsy reports are testimonial and
thus subject to the Confrontation Clause per Melendez-Diaz); see also State v. Ward, 364
N.C. 133, 147, 694 S.E.2d 738, 747 (2010) ("The practical effect of the Melendez-Diaz
ruling is that through cross-examination more light is being shed on the procedures expert
witnesses use to support their testimony.").
220. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. The burden Melendez-Diaz creates
is not a small one by any means, and states are trying to figure out the best way to deal
with the requirements. The ombudsman to the SBI Crime Lab has recommended that the
lab review the way it assigns cases to analysts and its procedures for notifying district
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D. Hampering Law Enforcement Personnel's Ability to Investigate
Crimes
Finally, some worry that laboratory independence will inhibit law
enforcement's ability to work with scientists to further their
investigative goals and direct the laboratory to work on the most
important cases."' This argument, however, cuts in favor of
independence-scientists should not be working in furtherance of the
police's investigative goals but in pursuit of the truth, whatever it may
be. Moreover, removing the lab from State oversight would not
prevent open lines of communication between law enforcement and
the lab. If the client wants certain evidence analyzed before others or
simply wants to call and check on results, there is no reason a private
laboratory would not or could not comply.
CONCLUSION
A lot can change in seventeen years, the amount of time Greg
Taylor spent in prison for a crime he did not commit. When Taylor
left prison, he had never talked on a cell phone, had missed watching
his daughter grow up and the birth of his grandson, and had learned
to suppress what most take for granted-the urge to plan for his
future.222 A year after his release, he was still learning how to live as a
free man, telling a reporter, "You can't just undo 17 years in one
year[.] I had to learn [in prison] how not to go anywhere, I had to
learn how not to have any aspiration or hopes .... ,,223 The
importance of freedom is at the very heart of the American criminal
justice system. "Innocent until proven guilty" is a maxim
encompassing an understanding that before we as a society take away
someone's liberty, we have to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt of
his guilt. Addressing the problems that led to Taylor's wrongful
imprisonment is another step toward that ideal.
The changes must be meaningful. This Comment proposes a
fundamental shift in the way forensic criminal analysis is conducted in
North Carolina. Private laboratories should assume the duties of the
SBI's Crime Lab through contracts with State and local authorities.
The State however, should remain involved to ensure that these labs
attorneys of lab analysts' scheduled leave time. OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT, supra note 34, at
25-27. These same issues will need to be worked out contractually with a private lab.
221. See Giannelli, supra note 74, at 228 n.453.




NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
are meeting its needs, employing the best scientific practices, and
satisfying standards designed to arrive at the truth and not convictions
or profit. A strong regulatory component to a private system
combines the best of both worlds-eliminating conditions that lead to
strong biases toward the State among scientists and counteracting the
prospect of misconduct or corruption occurring anyway. Moreover,
by monitoring accreditation and setting high standards for the
scientific evidence that enters the state's courts, a regulatory body can
ensure that a weak standard of admissibility is not the only thing
standing in the way of junk science. Finally, while this Comment
proposes several major changes, these suggestions are by no means
the only reforms that would prove helpful.224
The North Carolina General Assembly has shown itself capable
of identifying systemic failures. The renaming of the lab is an implicit
acknowledgment that there is something wrong with law enforcement
running a scientific institution. Yet, the Forensic Sciences Act of 2011
does nothing to alter that structure. Now, legislators must show
themselves capable of taking serious action to tackle these
deficiencies before more innocent men and women lose decades of
their lives to the status quo. North Carolina should use this scandal to
position itself as a leader in forensic science reform, becoming a
model for other states facing similar problems and rebuilding its
reputation along the way.
KAVITA PILLAI
224. For example, another proposal deserving consideration is to remove the lab from
law enforcement control and place it under the State Medical Examiner's Office.
Giannelli, supra note 13, 470-78. But see Neufeld, supra note 163, at S113 (noting that
medical examiners, too, often view themselves as arms of the prosecution).
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